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Commentary on Session IV 
The Historical Relationship 




he  three  papers  in  this  session,  by  Jeffrey  Williamson,  Gustav  Ranis, 
and James Hollifield, focus on the interconnections between migration, 
trade, and economic development, but they are quite distinct in terms of 
period covered, conceptual framework, and methodological approach. They are 
individually well argued and well written, but each also complements the others 




Williamson, an economic historian, brings his skills in economic theory, data 
analysis, and historical insights to his study of the “Inequality and Schooling Re-
sponses to Globalization Forces: Lessons from History.” Using a model with two 
countries (the New World and Europe) and three factors (unskilled labor, skilled 
labor, and land/capital), Williamson analyzes the effects of immigration during 
two periods, the period of mass migration pre-1914 and the period of minimal 
migration and immigration restrictions that followed.
While the two world wars and the Great Depression were exogenous to the 
trans-Oceanic migration flows, Williamson recognizes that the immigration re-29  Barry R. Chiswick
strictions in the countries of overseas settlement were endogenous to the supply 
of immigrants.
The period of mass migration was dominated by positively selected but large-
ly unskilled flows from Europe’s low-skilled labor surplus to the low-skilled, 
labor-scarce countries in the New World, in particular the U.S., Canada, and 
Australia. These flows raised low-skilled workers’ wages in Europe and lowered 
them in the destinations, compared with what otherwise would have occurred. 
This tended to reduce the real wage gap between Europe and the New World but 
also reduced income inequality in Europe and raised it in the New World. The 
absence of significant migration after 1914 resulted in a change in labor supplies 
that increased relative wage differentials, and hence inequality, in Europe but re-
duced relative wage differentials in the U.S., since low-skilled labor became more 
scarce as native-born workers increased their levels of skill.
Williamson also argues that these changes in labor supply due to interna-
tional migration were responsible for changes in rates of return from schooling 
that led to changes in the educational attainment of the labor force. This was one 
factor; other influences on the growth of schooling were the impacts of chang-
es in technology and school policies. The late nineteenth century technological 
revolution in manufacturing played an important role in increasing the rate of re-
turn from schooling, particularly in the United States, and thereby increasing the 
demand for secondary and tertiary schooling. Enrollments were increased by the 
lobbying success of school teachers and others in propagating the idea of free (no 
charges for attending) public secondary schooling and its eventual spread across 
the country. In the United Kingdom, binding minimum-school-leaving-age laws 
raised schooling levels. 
In reading Williamson’s account of events in the age of mass migration, if 
you replace the New World with the advanced, high-technology OECD countries 
of today and replace Europe with the developing countries of Asia, Africa, and 
Latin America, and perhaps the transition countries of Russia and Eastern Europe, 
it strikes me that Williamson’s text could be describing the current period. While 
there is much migration of high-skilled workers today, migration to the U.S. and 
Western Europe is now dominated by low-skilled workers from the less-devel-
oped countries. One consequence is increased inequality in the advanced econo-
mies as their native-born, lower-skilled workers pay the price of the large-scale 
influx of the low-skilled.
Gustav Ranis
In his paper, “Migration, Trade, Capital, and Development: Substitutes, Com-
plements, and Policies,” development economist Gustav Ranis brings the analysis 
explicitly into the contemporary period and models the incentives for migrating 
and the effects of legal barriers. As the potential supply of migrants exceeds the 29  Commentary on Session IV
legal limits, incentives exist for illegal migration. These incentives are realized if 
the enforcement mechanisms are insufficient. 
Liberal democracies have enacted provisions to enforce immigration law, in-
cluding border enforcement and interior enforcement, typically in the form of 
penalties against employers who knowingly hire illegal aliens (“employer sanc-
tions”). Yet, liberal democracies have difficulty enforcing these laws in the pres-
ence of employer groups, immigrant/ethnic constituencies, and civil libertarians 
who fundamentally endorse open borders. 
The argument that free trade advocates should favor open borders misses 
an important point. Migrants are different from shirts. When migrants cross bor-
ders, they acquire, de facto even if not de jure, political and economic rights 
that neither shirts nor the shirtmakers in less-developed countries acquire from 
the destinations. My shirt was made by Bangladeshi workers. If they made it in 
the U.S., their children would be entitled to schooling here, and given their low 
skills, their low wages would entitle them to subsidized medical care, perhaps 
subsidized housing, the Food Stamp Program, the Earned Income Tax Credit, and 
so on. If they make the shirt in Bangladesh, they receive no such benefits from 
the U.S. taxpayer.  
Ranis also correctly reminds us that the simple two-country, three-factor mod-
el does not tell the full story regarding the economic development of the country 
of origin. The developing countries benefit directly and indirectly from emigra-
tion. There are emigrant remittances—funds that go to families back home rather 
than to bureaucrats in the capital. Return migrants bring back skills (including en-
trepreneurial skills), technology, and connections acquired in the West. Because 
of the reduced supply of low-skilled workers, higher wages and employment 
for low-skilled workers reduce inequality and poverty. However, Ranis does not 
mention that if the emigration is positively selected, it may be the most able, the 
“best and the brightest,” who leave and do not return.
This raises a question seldom asked. If we are concerned about the economic 
well-being of a developing country, how should we measure economic welfare? 
Conventional measures focus on those living in the country. But if we are con-
cerned with people rather than countries, the emigrants should be considered 
as well. The positive effect of international migration on the economic welfare 
of Mexicans or Algerians, as distinct from Mexico and Algeria, must include the 
welfare of those who emigrated. If they move voluntarily, their welfare must have 
increased. 
I am reminded of Harberger’s triangles in reading Ranis’ paper. Barriers to 
voluntary exchange reduce economic exchange and thereby reduce economic 
welfare. Ranis reminds us that the barriers to international capital flows have 
been virtually eliminated and the barriers to trade in goods and services have 
been sharply reduced. The social welfare gains from further reductions in these 29  Barry R. Chiswick
barriers, while positive, are likely to be relatively small. Yet, in contrast to the 
preceding century of largely open migration, the recent century of restrictions on 
international migration has, in principle, created opportunities for welfare gains 
by removing these barriers. The greatest contributions to economic development, 
though, have come from advances in technology. These productivity-enhancing 
changes may originate in one country, but in the modern world the knowledge is 
quickly available worldwide. Which international migration regimes foster tech-
nological advancement? The free flow of high-technology workers to technology 
centers (for example, Silicon Valley and its equivalents elsewhere) may be the 
answer.
James Hollifield
So, the next questions are, why were these barriers enacted? and, could an 
international regime be created to better manage international migration? Politi-
cal scientist James Hollifield focuses on the latter question in his paper, “Trade, 
Migration, and Economic Development: The Risks and Rewards of Openness.” 
Part of the answer as to why barriers were enacted is that people are not 
like shirts. As mentioned above, migrants acquire political and economic rights in 
the destination that the shirtmakers in the country of origin do not obtain from 
the destination. These include economic benefits such as medical care, schooling 
for their children, and income transfers for the poor. They also include political 
rights, both explicit (voting) and implicit (people do matter even if they do not 
vote), which can be used to change the distribution of power, wealth, and prop-
erty rights. Impacts on the culture also matter, and while some may view these as 
positive, others may not.
There are interconnections between immigration policy and domestic policy. 
As landless, lower-skilled workers in the New World grew in number and espe-
cially as they acquired political rights in the nineteenth century, the balance of 
power changed between owners of land and capital on the one hand and low-
skilled workers on the other. The latter, fearing competition from low-skilled im-
migrants, favored restrictions and enacted them when they could in coalition with 
nativist elements and others.
Perhaps the most recent example was the 1996 welfare reform, which, among 
other provisions, barred recent immigrants from receiving certain federal income 
transfers. I believe that this welfare reform was legislated in part because of the 
1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act, which established a process by which 
nearly 3 million low-skilled illegal aliens were the direct beneficiaries of an am-
nesty and perhaps several million more were indirect beneficiaries.
It might be argued that the gain in income to natives who benefit from im-
migration exceeds the loss in income to the low-skilled natives from low-skilled 
immigration and that natives as a whole are better off. Moreover, in principle, the 299  Commentary on Session IV
gainers could compensate the losers so that everyone gains (Pareto optimality). In 
practice, however, the transfers might never take place. And if the income transfer 
system requires that low-skilled immigrants and natives be treated equally, the 
immigrants get these transfers as well. Then, it is easy to show that natives as a 
whole would lose as a result of equal treatment for low-skilled immigrants.
An interesting distinction arises between the direction of international trade 
and international migration. International trade is necessarily, over the long run, 
a two-way street. Imports must be paid for in some way. When comparing coun-
tries or regions with similar wage levels across skill groups, migration also tends 
to be a two-way street (for example, compare Canada and the U.S., the Nordic 
countries, or Illinois and Indiana). When this is the case, it is easier for countries 
to form international agreements on the free mobility of workers. Political con-
cern arises most intensely when migration is a one-way street, especially when 
those using the street are low-skilled workers. It is under these circumstances that 
nation states have divergent interests regarding the number, characteristics, and 
expected length of stay of the migrants. Under these circumstances international 
agreements are more difficult to establish. As an example, consider the agreement 
on the free mobility of labor in the initial European Union, where the differences 
in incomes across countries were small, compared with the current anxiety over 
the admission of the much-lower-income Turkey and the transition economies of 
Eastern Europe.
There is perhaps an irony that liberal democracies, having learned the hard 
way that there is no such thing as a group of temporary workers from less-devel-
oped areas, have become much more reluctant to enter into international agree-
ments regarding the acceptance of low-skilled guest workers. Autocratic regimes 
that can confine them in foreign worker enclaves, impose severe penalties on 
those who do not depart when their contract expires, and have severe visa restric-
tions would have less reluctance.
Hollifield would like to see a more ordered world in which international 
agreements help regulate the international flow of workers. A wide consensus 
can be reached on some issues, such as against the sex trade and forced (slavery) 
migration. On some matters, there can be bilateral and multilateral agreements, 
for example, across countries with similar income levels and income distribution. 
Yet, for much international migration from low-income to high-income countries, 
there is a wide divergence in interests. While issue-specific bilateral agreements 
might be negotiated, the prospects seem remote for nation states to turn over 
sovereignty to some international organization for regulating migration between 
low-income and high-income countries or even among countries at the same 
level of economic development. Moreover, if the international organization were 
to be captured by autocratic regimes, repression against potential emigrants and 
even immigrants might increase.